CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-HABEAS

CORPUS AND RIGHT TO
COUNSEL-SUPREME COURT PLURALITY DETERMINES THAT
SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS FOR HABEAS RELIEF MAY ONLY BE
GRANTED IF DEFENDANT CAN DEMONSTRATE "COLORABLE
SHOWING OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE" AND SIXTH AMENDMENT
DOES NOT FORBID ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO INFORMANT-Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S.

Ct. 2616 (1986).
An imprisonment violative of the United States Constitution
may be challenged by a writ of habeas corpus.1

The writ of

habeas corpus is grounded upon a deeply rooted belief that incarceration resulting from an abridgement of a defendant's constitutional rights is intolerable. 2 Utilization of habeas corpus
proceedings, however, is not unbounded.3 The entitlement of
criminal defendants to vindicate their federal constitutional
rights has historically conflicted with considerations of federalism
and the perceived need for finality in criminal litigation.4
Supreme Court decisions have confronted this inherent tension
on numerous occasions. 5 The Court recently addressed these

fundamental conflicts surrounding the writ of habeas corpus in
I See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982). Section 2241 states in pertinent part:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions....
(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge
may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and
may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof;
or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of
an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of
a court or judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States....
2 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
3 See generally Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: Great Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597 (1985) (analyzing recent cases restricting right to habeas corpus relief).
4 See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (examining situations in which federal courts'
habeas corpus jurisdiction should be utilized to relitigate constitutional issues decided in state criminal proceedings).
5 See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
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Kuhlmann v. Wilson. 6
On July 4, 1970, three armed individuals robbed the Star
Taxicab Garage located in the Bronx, New York.7 During the
course of the robbery, the night dispatcher was fatally shot.8
Three witnesses identified Joseph Wilson as being on the premises before the robbery occurred.9 Additionally, the witnesses
observed Wilson fleeing the scene of the crime, carrying money
in his arms."0 Wilson voluntarily surrendered to the police on
July 8, 1970." After receiving his Miranda warnings, Wilson admitted that he had been present during the commission of the
no part in the
crimes.' 2 He stated, however, that he had played
3
robbery and that he was merely a witness.'
After arraignment and assignment of counsel, Wilson was
confined in the Bronx House of Detention. 14 Pursuant to the
plan of New York City Detective Cullen, Wilson was transferred
to a cell which overlooked the scene of the crime.' 5 Wilson's
cellmate was prisoner Benny Lee,' 6 who had agreed with Detective Cullen to act as a police informant. 1 7 Lee was instructed to
"keep his ears open' 8 and "to see if [he] could find out"' 9 the
(1953); Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
6 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
7 Id. at 2619 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
8 Id.
9 The witnesses implicated Wilson in the crimes by identifying photographs in
police possession. Brief for Respondent at 2, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616,
No. 84-1479 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
10 Id. Only two of the three witnesses who testified to seeing Wilson on the
premises of the Star Garage prior to the robbery also claimed to have seen him
fleeing the scene of the crime carrying money. Id.
I' Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 742 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
12 Id. Wilson was a former employee of the Star Taxicab Garage. Kuhlmann, 106
S. Ct. at 2619 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
13 Id. Wilson further contended that his flight was a result of his fear of being
blamed for the crime. Wilson, 742 F.2d at 742.
14 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 742. Wilson was arraigned and assigned counsel onJuly 9,
1970. Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 3.
15 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 742.
16 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2619 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Lee, a narcotics
addict and a third time offender, was being held at the Bronx House of Detention
awaiting sentencing on a guilty plea for a reduced charge of third degree robbery.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 3.
17 Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 3. Lee had known Detective Cullen for
five years. Id. During this period Cullen had utilized Lee's services as an informant
for the police. Id.
18 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2619 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Detective Cullen
had approached Lee on July 7, 1970, one day before Wilson's surrender. Brief for
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identity of the other perpetrators involved in the robbery and
murder at the Star Taxicab Garage.20
Viewing the scene of the robbery visibly upset Wilson,
prompting him to discuss the crimes with Lee. 2 ' Wilson related
to Lee the identical account of events which he had given to the
police at the time of his arrest.2 2 Lee advised Wilson to "come
up with a better story' 23 since Wilson's first one "didn't sound
too good."' 24 Initially Wilson did not alter his story, but he later
began to change details in his original narrative.25 Eventually,
Wilson admitted his participation in the crimes to Lee.26 Shortly
thereafter, Lee reported Wilson's inculpatory remarks to Detective Cullen.27
Wilson was subsequently indicted and charged with murder
28 A pre-trial Huntley29
and felonious possession of a weapon.
Respondent, supra note 9, at 3. Showing Lee a photograph of Wilson, Detective
Cullen asked Lee if he was at all familiar with Wilson. Id. Lee revealed that he had
"'seen him around' but did not know Wilson very well." Id. Cullen then asked Lee
to attempt to elicit any information that could help establish the case against Wilson. Id.
19 Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 3. The testimony at trial never clearly
resolved the issue whether Lee received some form of consideration for his testimony against Wilson. Id. at 3-4. Evidence was presented, however, which revealed
that in the past Lee had been paid to provide the police with information which he
elicited from select criminal defendants. Id.
20 Id. at 3. Lee testified at trial that he had served as an informant for the police
on more than 100 prior occasions. Id.
21 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 742. Upon entering the cell, and viewing the scene of the
crime, Wilson's first words to Lee were that "someone's messing with me because
this is the place I'm accused of robbing." Id.
22 Id. Wilson stated that on the night of the robbery he was visiting his brother
who worked at the Star Garage. Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 4.
23 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2619 n.1 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 2619 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Wilson's change of heart may also
be partially attributed to a visit he received from his brother. Id. During their conversation, Wilson's brother told him that their family was upset by Wilson's implication in the shooting and robbery. Id. at 2619-20 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
26 Id. at 2620 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Although descriptions of the other
perpetrators were given to the police by eye witnesses, they were never apprehended. Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 4 n. 1.
27 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2620 (Powell,J., plurality opinion). Lee spent nine to
ten days alone with Wilson in the cell overlooking the scene of the crime. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 9, at 5. During this time, Wilson gradually began to change
details in his account of the events surrounding the robbery of the Star Garage. Id.
Lee surreptitiously recorded a written account of these conversations with Wilson.
Id. Lee then gave these notes to Detective Cullen. Id.
28 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 742.
29 See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1965). Huntley established the pre-trial procedure utilized in New York criminal
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hearing was held in response to Wilson's motion to suppress
Lee's testimony at trial."0 The motion was denied based on the
trial court's determination that Wilson's statements to Lee were
voluntary and unsolicited, rather than a product of an interrogation. 3 1 A jury convicted Wilson of common law murder and felonious possession of a weapon. 32 Direct appeals to the appellate
33
division and to the New York Court of Appeals were unavailing.
Having exhausted his state remedies, 34 Wilson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.3 5 The habeas petition alleged that Wilson's sixth amendment right to counsel had
been violated by the admission of Lee's testimony at trial. 36 The
district court denied the writ and reasoned that no sixth amendment violation could be present where formal interrogation by
Lee was absent. 37 The court found that Wilson's statements were
spontaneous rather than the product of interrogation, and accordingly, it rejected Wilson's argument. 38 The district court's
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.3 ° Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in 1979.40

The following year, the United States Supreme Court ancases when a defendant moves to suppress evidence at trial. See id. at 78, 204
N.E.2d at 183, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
30 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 742.
31 Id. The denial of Wilson's suppression motion resulted in the admittance of
Lee's testimony into evidence at trial. Id.
32 Id. Wilson was sentenced to twenty years to life for his part in the murder of
the dispatcher at the Star Garage. Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 6. For the
weapons count, he was sentenced to a concurrent term not to exceed seven years.
Id.
33 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 742. The trial court's decision was affirmed by the appellate division without an opinion. People v. Wilson, 41 A.D. 2d 903, 343 N.Y.S.2d
563 (1973). Wilson was denied leave to appeal by the New York Court of Appeals.
Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2620 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
34 A federal court will not review a habeas corpus petition until all potential state
remedies have been exhausted. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977).
35 Kuhlmann, 106 U.S. at 2620 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Wilson's petition
for habeas corpus relief was filed pro se. Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 6.
36 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2620 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
37 Id.

38 Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1187 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 945 (1979).
39 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2620 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
40 Wilson v. Henderson, 442 U.S. 945 (1979). The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari without opinion. See id.
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nounced its decision in United States v. Henry.4 ' The Henry Court
utilized the test enunciated in Massiah v. United States 42 to suppress statements made by a defendant to a paid police informant.43 Massiah held that a defendant is denied the basic
protections of the sixth amendment when statements are "deliberately elicited" after indictment and in the absence of counsel.44
The Henry Court, however, expanded the protections of Massiah
by asserting that a sixth amendment violation occurs when the
government creates an atmosphere "likely to induce" inculpatory
statements from the defendant.45 Consequently, with reliance on
this new standard, Wilson filed a motion in state court to vacate
his conviction.46 Wilson contended that admission of Lee's testimony was unconstitutional in light of Henry.47 The motion, however, was denied on the grounds that Henry was both factually
distinguishable and incapable of having retroactive effect.48 The
appellate division denied Wilson's application for leave to
appeal.49
Having again exhausted all available state court remedies,
Wilson filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
district court.50 This second habeas petition was also denied.5 '
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this determination, finding Henry to be factually indistinguishable. 52 The
circuit court repudiated the notion that principles of finality
should be dispositive of Wilson's habeas petition.53 Instead, the
court of appeals considered Wilson's application because it believed that the "ends of justice" required the granting of re41 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
42 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
43 See id. at 206.
44 Id. Massiah established that once a defendant's sixth amendment right to

counsel has attached, any statements deliberately elicited in the absence of his attorney must be excluded from evidence at trial. Id.
45 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
46 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2621 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
47 Id.

48 Id. Henry was distinguished on the basis that the informant in Henry had been

paid by the government. Wilson, 742 F.2d at 743.
49 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2621 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Wilson's petition
was denied on the grounds that his case was distinguishable on its face from Henry.
Id.
50 Id.

51 Id. The district court concluded that Wilson's inculpatory statements to Lee
were spontaneous rather than the product of interrogation. Id.
52 Id. The circuit court found that all the elements given consideration by the
Henry Court were also present in Wilson's case. Wilson, 742 F.2d at 745.
53 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 743.
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view. 5 4 Applying the standards enunciated in Henry,5 5 the Second
Circuit determined that the lower court had erred 56 and remanded the case to the district court.5 7 Simultaneously, the state
of New York sought review of the circuit court's ruling. 58 In response, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
permit review of both issues: the applicability of Henry and the
legitimacy of the circuit court's entertaining of successive habeas
corpus petitions. 59 In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit.60
SUCCESSIVE WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS

Historically, the Supreme Court has displayed a willingness

to reevaluate and modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ
of habeas corpus. 6 Perhaps the most obvious reason for this
mutability is the significance of the principles underlying the
writ's existence.62 Habeas corpus is rooted in the principle "that
in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to

the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of

law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release. "63

Originally a common law right, the writ of habeas corpus is
54 Id.

55 See infra notes 141-151 and accompanying text for a discussion of Henry.
56 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 745. The circuit court found that Lee's ongoing conversations with Wilson, coupled with the scene intentionally staged by the government,
induced Wilson to make the incriminating remarks. Id.
57 Id. at 748. The district court was instructed to order Wilson's release from
prison unless the state elected to relitigate the charges. Id.
58 See Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2621 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
59 Id. at 2621-22 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
60 Id. at 2622 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
61 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (establishing "cause and
prejudice" standard for review of habeas corpus); Stone v.Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976) (eliminating habeas corpus review of fourth amendment challenges where
state court has provided full and fair opportunity for review of issue); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (examining degree of deference that federal court must
give to state court's determination of constitutional issues on habeas review); Waley
v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (eliminating concept of jurisdiction as primary
consideration in granting federal habeas corpus review); Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (broadening concept of
habeas corpus jurisdiction of federal courts).
62 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963). According to the Court, development of habeas corpus is "inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental
rights of personal liberty. For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints." Id. at 40102.
63 Id.

at 402.
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explicitly recognized in the United States Constitution. 64 Initially, the habeas corpus writ did not extend to prisoners in state
custody.6 5 Seeking to extend the protection of the habeas corpus
writ to prisoners in state custody, Congress expanded the statutory language of the Judiciary Act of 1867.66 Consequently, the
made available to those in
writ of habeas corpus was expressly
67
either state or federal custody.
Originally, the grounds for the granting of a habeas petition
were exceedingly narrow.6" Gradually, the Court expanded the
availability of habeas corpus review to preserve the constitutional
rights of a criminal defendant. 69 Most attempts at expansion or
contraction of the writ's scope, however, engendered heated debate. 70 The granting of successive habeas corpus petitions is one
facet of the writ that has elicited such debate. 7 '
In 1923, the Court first considered the issue of successive
habeas corpus petitions in Salinger v. Loisel.7 2 The situation in Salinger arose as a result of the defendant's persistent resistance to
the government's efforts to remove him to the District of South
Dakota.7 3 In that case, Salinger, indicted on charges of mail
fraud, posted bail but later failed to appear in the South Dakota
District Court. 4 In an attempt to avoid the jurisdiction of the
district court, Salinger fled to New York.75 Once his whereabouts
64 Habeas corpus is incorporated into the United States Constitution in the following provision: "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
65 See Fay, 372 U.S. at 409.
66 Id. at 415-18. See also Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. 2622 n.7 (Powell, J., plurality
opinion).
67 See Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
68 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977). Until the twentieth century,
the substantive scope of review was exclusively limited to the concept of jurisdiction. Id. A court entertaining a habeas corpus petition was exclusively limited to
reviewing the validity of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Id. at 78-79. In
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), this limitation was expressly abandoned.
Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 79.
69 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561
(1953); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). The Court's decisions, however,
have not been exclusively limited to extending the scope of habeas corpus review.
See supra note 61.
70 See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 78. See also supra notes 61 and 68.
71 See generally Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 451 (1966) (tracing development of habeas corpus doctrine).
72 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
73 Id. at 225-26.
74 Id. at 226-27.
75 Id. at 226.
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were discovered, proceedings were begun to arrest and remove
him from New York to South Dakota.76 After his arrest, Salinger
petitioned for habeas corpus relief in New York. 7 This petition
was denied.78
Rather than remand Salinger into a marshal's custody to insure his removal to South Dakota, the New York court, with misplaced trust, allowed Salinger to again post a bond for his
release. 79 Before he was scheduled to appear in South Dakota,
Salinger travelled to New Orleans and voluntarily appeared
before a local commissioner with a representative of the surety
that issued his bond in New York.80 Salinger was subsequently
held in a Louisiana marshal's custody to await the issuance of an
order for his removal to South Dakota.8 ' Salinger filed another
petition for habeas corpus relief in Louisiana and was once again
released on bail pending a hearing on the habeas petition. 2
While awaiting the results of this proceeding, Salinger was arrested for his failure to appear in South Dakota as ordered. 3
This resulted in the issuance of a third petition for habeas corpus
review.8 4 After habeas relief was denied, Salinger appealed to
the Supreme Court for review of the denials of his successive
habeas corpus petitions.8 5
The Salinger Court first addressed the state's contention that
the habeas decision in New York should be considered a final
adjudication and that all subsequent habeas reviews were precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.86 Writing for the Court,
Justice Van Devanter refuted the state's per se application of the
doctrine and observed that at common law resjudicatadid not ap76 Id. The presiding commissioner in New York found probable cause after reviewing Salinger's indictment and instructed him to await issuance of a warrant for
his removal. Id.
77 Id. Salinger was granted a hearing at which probable cause was found to detain him until a warrant could be issued for his removal to South Dakota. Id.
78 Id. Salinger appealed the denial of his habeas petition, but the circuit court
affirmed the decision of the district court. Id.
79 Id. at 227. Salinger had been ordered to appear in the South Dakota district
court two weeks after his New York habeas appeal was reviewed. Id.
80 Id. The surety's representative undertook the surrender with Salinger's complete consent. Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. Salinger was again incarcerated pending the issuance of a warrant for his
removal to South Dakota. Id.
84 Id. at 228. Despite his previous record, Salinger was again released on bail
pending the court's hearing of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 230.
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ply to denial of habeas corpus relief.8 7 The Justice noted, however, that "it does not follow that a refusal to discharge on one
application is without bearing or weight when a later application
is being considered." ' The Salinger Court asserted that the principle of res judicata was insufficient in and of itself to dispose of
the issue of what treatment should be accorded successive habeas
petitions.89 Justice Van Devanter opined that the Court should
maintain a policy of disposing each successive habeas petition by
exercising "a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by
a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the discharge sought." 0 Thus, although the traditional res
judicata doctrine was inapplicable, a court "may take into consideration the fact that a previous application has been made to another officer and refused; and in some instances that fact may
justify a refusal of the second."9' The Supreme Court maintained that this policy would secure the status of habeas corpus as
a "privileged writ of freedom ' 9 2 while simultaneously safeguarding against abuse of the writ.9 3 Accordingly, Justice Van Devanter established that the per se use of the doctrine of resjudicata
was inapplicable in successive habeas corpus proceedings. 4
The Court did not address the issue of successive habeas
corpus petitions until forty years later when it rendered its decision in the landmark case of Sanders v. United States.9 5 In Sanders,
the defendant pleaded guilty9 6 to charges of bank robbery after
waiving indictment and the assistance of counsel.9 7 He later filed
87
88

Id.

Id.
89 Id. at 230-31.
90 Id. at 231.
91 Id. The consideration of the court on the second petition "will naturally be

affected to some degree by the character of the court or officer to whom the first
application was made, and the fullness of the consideration given to it." Id. at 23132 (quoting Ex Parte Cuddy, 40 F. 62 (1889)).
92

Id.

at 232.

93 Id.
94 Id. at 230. The Court noted that "[t]he state courts generally have accepted
that rule where not modified by statute; the lower federal courts usually have given
effect to it; and this Court has conformed to it and thereby sanctioned it, although
announcing no express decision on the point." Id. at 230.
95 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
96 Id. at 4. Before his sentencing, Sanders admitted to his drug addiction and
requested to be sent for drug rehabilitation. Id. The presiding judge agreed to
recommend this course of action. Id.
97 Id. Sanders failed to raise any claim pertaining to the adequacy of the procedure employed "to advise him of his constitutional rights to assistance of counsel,
grand jury indictment, and trial by jury." Id. at 4 n.2.
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a petition for habeas corpus relief which was denied."8 Sanders
then filed a second habeas application alleging mental incompetence at his trial and sentencing due to his narcotic addiction. 99
The district court denied Sander's motion on the ground that he
should have introduced the issue of his mental incompetency at
the time of his first motion.1 °° The court of appeals affirmed this
decision. 101

In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision. 10 2 The Court asserted that "a
prisoner shall be granted a hearing on a motion which alleges
sufficient facts to support a claim for relief unless the motion and
the files and the records of the case 'conclusively show' that the
claim is without merit."' 0 3 Justice Brennan observed that the
principles promulgated in Salinger were not rigid rules; 10 4 accordingly, he asserted that a court is permitted, not compelled, to decline to entertain a successive habeas petition. 10 5
The Sanders Court established a standard of review to assist
courts in determining when controlling weight should be given
to the prior denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief.'0 6 The
test contemplated a situation in which the "ground"' 0 7 presented
in the successive petition was the same "ground" determined ad98 Id. at 5. The habeas petition was denied because it stated conclusions rather
than facts. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that the files and records conclusively
showed that Sanders was not entitled to relief. Id.
99 Id. Because of his addiction, Sanders was intermittently given drugs by the
jail's medical personnel. Id.

100 Id. at 6.

101 Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 373 U.S.
1 (1963). In a per curiam opinion, the court of appeals held:
Where, as here, it is apparent from the record that at the time of filing
the first motion the movant knew the facts on which the second motion
is based, yet in the second motion set forth no reason why he was previously unable to assert the new ground and did not allege that he had
previously been unaware of the significance of the relevant facts, the
district court, may, in its discretion, decline to entertain the second
motion.
Id. at 736-37.
102 Sanders, 373 U.S. at 6. The Supreme Court held that the sentencing court
should have granted a hearing for the successive habeas petition. Id.
103

104

Id.
Id. at 12.

105 Id. The Court reaffirmed the principle expressed in Salinger that the doctrine
of resjudicatawas inherently inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings. Id.; see also
supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text (discussion of Salinger).
106 Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15.
107 The Court defined "ground" to mean "a sufficient legal basis for granting the
relief sought by the applicant." Id. at 16.
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versely to the defendant, on the merits, in a prior application.'°s
Additionally, the Sanders Court determined that "the ends ofjustice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application."' 10 9 The Court emphasized that the essence of
the test is " 'the ends ofjustice' " and that this phrase "cannot be
too finely particularized."" 0 The Court ruled that the burden of
proof rests on the applicant to show that "although the ground
of the new application was determined against him on the merits
on a prior application, the ends of justice would be served by a
redetermination of the ground.""' The Court asserted that the
burden of proof, however, shifts to the government to show an
abuse of the writ

1

2

if a different ground is presented by a new

application or if the same ground was presented earlier but was
not adjudicated on the merits. 1 3 In either situation, the Court
established that determinations are ultimately delegated to the
"sound discretion of the federal trial judges." ' 4 Accordingly,
the Court remanded the case to the district court to reconsider
'
the denial of Sander's successive habeas corpus petition. 15
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The exclusion of evidence for violation of a defendant's right
to the assistance of counsel is a relatively modern development in
criminal procedure. Spano v. New York 116 presaged the expansion

of the sixth amendment to exclude the admission of evidence de108

Id.

109 Id. at 15. The Court held that "[ilf purely legal questions are involved, the
applicant may be entitled to a new hearing upon showing an intervening change in
the law or some other justification for having failed to raise a crucial point or argument in the prior application." Id. at 17.
11o Id. In adopting the "ends ofjustice" test, the Court seemed to indicate that it
wanted to establish a flexible, broad standard for review of successive habeas petitions. See id.
Ill Id.
112 Id. at 10-12. Relying on Sanders, the Kuhlmann Court noted that "[t]he concept of 'abuse of the writ' is founded on the equitable nature of habeas corpus."
Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2622 n.6 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). If a defendant "engages in other conduct that 'disentitles him to the relief he seeks', the federal court
may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that the prisoner has abused
the writ." Id. (quoting Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17-19).
113 Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15-17.
114 Id. at 18. The establishment of this broad, discretionary standard for reviewing successive habeas petitions reflects the principle that habeas corpus relief has
historically been viewed as "governed by equitable principles." Id. at 17.

115 Id. at 23.

116 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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liberately elicited in the absence of counsel." 17 The Spano Court
relied upon the "totality of the circumstances test" to reverse a
criminal conviction obtained through the use of a coerced confession." 8 FourJustices in two concurring opinions averred that
the outcome could have been similarly resolved on sixth amendment grounds. 119 They opined that reversal of the conviction
was required on the specific ground that deliberate elicitation of
a confession after indictment, as well as the failure to provide
20
counsel when requested, was violative of the sixth amendment.
The concurring Justices in Spano asserted that the constitutional
guarantee of counsel's assistance at trial was intended to protect
an indicted defendant during police interrogation in extrajudicial
proceedings.12 1 The concurring Justices observed that providing
a defendant with any less protection potentially denies him "effective representation by counsel
at the only stage when legal aid
122
and advice would help him.'

The theories espoused by the concurring Justices in Spano
23
were adopted by the Court in 1964 in Massiah v. United States.'
Id. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring). The sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches at least at the time of indictment. Id. at 326-27 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Later cases have broadened this protection to apply at the time that adversary judicial proceedings have commenced. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 20506 (1964).
118 Id. at 320-24. Prior to Miranda, courts utilized a "totality of the circumstances
test" to determine if a confession was coerced. All the circumstances surrounding
the confession were examined to determine if the statements were made voluntarily. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (confessions held inadmissible when obtained by subterfuge and force); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(1941) (confession held involuntary unless product of defendant's free and rational
choice); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confession held inadmissible if
product of coercion and brutality).
119 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324-26 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 326-27 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
120 Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
121 Id. Historically, the Court has determined that the period of time following
arraignment until the time of trial is the most critical span of time in the criminal
proceedings. Id. at 327 (Douglas, J., concurring). During this time, a criminal defendant's rights must be carefully protected. See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
122 Spano, 360 U.S. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring). The power of sixth amendment protections espoused by the concurring Justices in Spano were viewed as being reflective of the basic constitutional principles established more than 25 years
earlier in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). See Spano, 360 U.S. at 325
(Douglas, J., concurring).
123 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah developed from the perceived need to restrain
the coercive power of the police. See generally Kamisar, "Interrogation" After Brewer v.
Willians, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978).
117
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Following his indictment, Massiah retained counsel and pleaded
not guilty to charges of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. 124 Federal agents utilized Massiah's co-defendant as an informer to elicit inculpatory statements from Massiah while he was
free on bail. 125 These incriminating statements were instrumental in obtaining Massiah's conviction. 126 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the basis that the inculpatory statements
were acquired in violation of Massiah's sixth amendment right to
27
counsel. 1
The Massiah Court determined that the basic protections of
the sixth amendment right to counsel are denied a defendant
when, after indictment, information is deliberately elicited in the
absence of his attorney. 128 The Court noted that if the protection afforded by a guarantee of counsel "is to have any efficacy it
must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as
those conducted in the jailhouse."' 29 The Court declared that
the imposition on the right to counsel is even more serious when
a defendant is unaware that he is under interrogation by a government agent. 30 The Massiah Court concluded that a defendant's inculpatory statements deliberately elicited after the right to
counsel attaches must therefore be excluded from evidence at
trial. '
124 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202. Massiah was a merchant seaman aboard the S.S.
Santa Maria. Id. When the Santa Maria arrived in New York, federal agents
searched the ship and uncovered five packages containing approximately three and
a half pounds of cocaine. Id. Evidence was found linking Massiah to the drugs. Id.
125 Id. An individual named Colson was arrested for the identical substantive offense. Id. Colson was released on bail at approximately the same time as Massiah.
Id. Several days after their conditional release, Colson decided to assist the government in its investigation of the alleged narcotics trafficking. Id. Massiah was unaware of Colson's cooperation with the government. Id.
126 Id. at 203. In order to elicit information from the unsuspecting Massiah, Colson allowed the government to install a radio transmitter in the front of his automobile. Id. at 202-03. On November 19, 1959, Colson met with Massiah in his car.
Id. at 203. The two men engaged in a lengthy conversation while a government
agent sat nearby listening to the transmission. Id. These statements were used
against Massiah at his trial. Id.
127
128

Id. at 207.

Id. at 206. The right to counsel can be waived but the waiver must be voluntary and knowing. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
129 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
130 Id. The Massiah Court, in resolving the issue on sixth amendment grounds,
declined to address potential fourth amendment grounds for holding Massiah's
statements inadmissible. Id. The Court apparently wished to utilize the opportunity presented to firmly establish the sixth amendment right to counsel as a viable
protection for criminal defendants. See id. at 204.
131 Id. at 206-07. The Court declared that its holding in Massiah only prohibited
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The principles established in Massiah were reasserted in the
1977 decision of Brewer v. Williams.' 3 2 In that case, the defendant
Williams was arrested, arraigned, and committed to jail for the
abduction and murder of a young girl. 133 During a police escorted transfer to Des Moines, Iowa, Williams expressed his intention to remain silent until he reached his attorney.' 34
Nevertheless, one of the police officers elicited inculpatory statements from the deeply religious defendant by delivering what has
become known as the "Christian burial speech."'' 35 Williams' incriminating actions and statements were subsequently used to
obtain his conviction.'
In affirming the lower courts' decisions,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the conviction was
violative of Williams' sixth amendment right to counsel.' 37
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart asserted that Massiah clearly established that, once the adversary process has begun, a defendant has a right to legal representation whenever the
the use of a criminal defendant's own incriminating remarks against himself at trial.
Id. at 207. The decision did not prohibit these remarks from being utilized by the
prosecution against other potential criminal defendants. See id.
132 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The result in Brewer also could have been reached by
applying the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination instead of
utilizing the sixth amendment right to counsel argument.
133 Id. at 390-91. The victim, Pamela Powers, was ten years old at the time of her
death. Id. at 390. She was abducted on December 24, 1968 while attending her
brother's wrestling tournament at a local YMCA with her family. Id. Shortly before
her abduction and murder, Williams had escaped from a mental hospital. Id.
134 Id. at 392. Williams had two attorneys, one in Davenport where he was apprehended and another in Des Moines. Id. at 390-91. Williams' Davenpori attorney
was denied permission to travel with the defendant during the police escorted ride
to Des Moines. Id. at 391-92. The escorting officers agreed that Williams was not
to be questioned until he reached his other attorney at the journey's end. Id. at
391.
135 Id. at 392. The "Christian burial speech" was delivered by one of the detectives who addressed Williams as Reverend and stated:
They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that
you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body
is, that yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top
of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And since we will be going
right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop
and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled
to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them
on Christmas Eve and murdered. ...
Id. at 392-93.
136 Id. at 394. Williams directed the police to where Pamela Powers was buried.
Id. at 393.
137 Id. at 406. Following his conviction, Williams sought habeas corpus relief in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Id. at 394. The
district court held that Williams' actions and statements were improperly admitted
at trial. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 395.
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government interrogates him.' 38 Justice Stewart ruled that the
"Christian burial speech" was "tantamount to interrogation." 139
Consequently, the majority held that any inculpatory
statements
0
extracted from Williams were inadmissible.14
The scope of the sixth amendment protections were next
confronted by the Court in 1980 in United States v. Henry. 14 1 In
that case, the defendant, Henry, was indicted for armed robbery
142
and placed in jail with another would-be inmate, Nichols.
Nichols, however, was a paid government informant. 143 Nichols
had been instructed to acquire information without initiating
conversations concerning Henry's pending charges. 14 4 While
Nichols did not ask pointed questions, he did engage in conver45
sations which elicited inculpatory statements from Henry.1
The Henry Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice Burger, substantially expanded the reach of Massiah by broadly interpreting
the standard of "deliberate elicitation."' 146 Chief Justice Burger
began his analysis by emphatically refusing the dissent's recommendation to reconsider the continuing vitality of Massiah."47
The Chief Justice noted that "the mere fact of custody imposes
138

Id. at 401.

139 Id. at 400. Williams' mental instability and deeply religious nature were con-

tributing factors in the Court's decision that the "Christian burial speech" was tantamount to interrogation. Id.
140 See id. at 406. Justice Stewart addressed the state's contention that Williams
had waived his sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 404-05. The Justice stated
that there was no affirmative evidence to indicate that Williams waived his rights.
See id. at 405-06. Additionally, Justice Stewart observed that the state has the burden of proving "'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege.' " Id. at 404 (quotingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
14 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
142 Id. at 266. Nichols had been convicted of forgery. Id.
143 Id. While incarcerated, Nichols had frequently been paid by the FBI to provide them with confidential information. Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 267. Henry confided in Nichols, describing the details of the robbery to
him. Id.
146 Id. at 270-75. Henry broadened the scope of the inquiry that courts must make
when determining whether "deliberate elicitation" is present. Id. at 274. The
Henry Court held that a court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the elicitation of inculpatory statements to determine if these factors create a situation "likely to induce" a defendant to incriminate himself. Id.
147 Id. at 269 n.6. Justice Rehnquist expounded his view of Massiah and its progeny in his dissenting opinion in Henry. Id. at 289 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Far
from desiring the expansion of Massiah that Henry accomplished, the Justice sought
a re-examination of Massiah's language and holding. Id. at 290. Justice Rehnquist
contended that the Massiah line of cases "rests on a prophylactic application of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel that in [his] view entirely ignores the doctrinal
foundation of that right." Id. at 289 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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pressures on the accused; confinement may bring into play subtle
susceptible to the ploys
influences that will make him particularly
1 48
of undercover Government agents."'

Chief Justice Burger next rejected the argument that Brewer
restricted the applicability of Massiah's "deliberately elicited" test
to situations where the functional equivalent of affirmative government interrogation was present. 49 Instead, he expanded the
definition of "deliberate elicitation" to cover instances in which
the government intentionally created a situation likely to induce
the defendant to make inculpatory remarks. 50 Observing that
the government had created just such an atmosphere in Henry,
the Court held that the inculpatory remarks obtained by Nichols
were inadmissible. 151
The principle promulgated by the Supreme Court in Henry
1 52
was reaffirmed in the 1985 decision of Maine v. Moulton.
Moulton's conviction for burglary and theft was primarily based
upon the admission into evidence of inculpatory statements
made to an undercover government informant. 53 These incriminating remarks were elicited after Moulton's right to counsel had
attached. 154 Drawing from the Henry and Massiah decisions, the
Court reversed the conviction, holding that the sixth amendment
"guarantee includes the State's affirmative obligation not to act
in a manner that circumvents the protections afforded the accused by invoking this right."' 155 Therefore, the Maine Court asserted that "[t]he determination whether particular action by
Id. at 274.
See id. at 271. In Brewer, the Court determined that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel was violated because the "Christian burial speech"
was the functional equivalent of interrogation. See supra notes 132-140 and accompanying text (discussion of Brewer).
150 Henry, 447 U.S. at 270. The Henry Court held three factors to be dispositive in
finding deliberate elicitation: "First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid
informant for the Government; second Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the
time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols." Id.
151 Id. at 270-71, 274-75.
152 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985).
153 Id. at 482-83.
154 Id. at 485. The Court observed that Moulton had been indicted prior to the
elicitation of his remarks, and accordingly, his right to counsel had attached. Id.
155 Id. at 487. The Court noted that a defendant will seldom be able to produce
direct proof of the state's knowledge. Id. at 487 n. 12. The Moulton Court observed,
however, that evidence indicating that the state must have known that the actions of
its agent were likely to induce incriminating statements in the absence of counsel is
sufficient to constitute a violation of the sixth amendment. Id.; see also Henry, 447
U.S. at 271.
148

149
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state agents violates the accused's right to assistance of counsel
56
must be made in light of this obligation."'1
In these prior decisions, the Supreme Court appeared to
sanction both an expansive utilization of the sixth amendment
right to counsel and a liberal attitude toward the granting of successive habeas petitions. In these prior cases, however, the Court
has rarely reached a unanimous decision. The strong dissenting
and concurring opinions surrounding these issues reflect the unsettled nature of this area of law. The debate flowing from these
constitutional issues was evidenced in the Court's split decision
1 57
in Kuhlmann v. Wilson.
Justice Powell, writing for the Kuhlmann plurality, began his
analysis of successive habeas corpus petitions with an examination of Sanders. 15 8 The Justice noted that Sanders did not set forth
particularized guidelines for determining when the "ends of justice" would be served by relitigating issues decided adversely to a
defendant.' 59 Attempting to ameliorate this situation, Justice
Powell defined considerations that should guide the disposition
of successive habeas corpus petitions. 160 He sought to redefine
the Sanders "ends of justice" test as a balancing of the need for
finality in criminal litigation and the right of recourse to habeas
corpus relief.161

In redefining Sanders, Justice Powell relied on cases in which
the Court denied habeas corpus jurisdiction because the cost to
the government in granting review outweighed the interest of the
defendant.' 62 Similarly, the Justice drew from the text and legis156

Moulton, 106 S. Ct. at 487.

157 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2618-19. AlthoughJustice Powell authored the opin-

ion of the Court in Kuhlmann, his treatment of successive habeas corpus petitions
resulted in a splintering of the majority. Id. Only three other members of the
Court, ChiefJustice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor, could be persuaded to concur with Justice Powell's explication of the habeas corpus issue delineated in Parts II and III of the Court's opinion. Id. WhileJustice White andJustice
Blackmun joined the plurality in voting for reversal, they refused to indorse the
plurality's interpretation of habeas corpus relief. See id.
158 Id. at 2622 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
159 See id. Justice Brennan, in dissent, believed that this omission by the Sanders
Court was intentional. Id. at 2631 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Justice further
stated that Sanders purposely established a broad standard for review of successive
habeas corpus petitions. Id. at 2631-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice
Brennan asserted that the Sanders Court desired to leave determinations of this sensitive issue to the discretion of the federal trial judges. Id.; see also supra notes 95115 and accompanying text (discussion of Sanders).
160 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
161 Id. at 2626 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
162 Id. at 2622-24 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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lative history of the habeas corpus statutes which, in pertinent
part, set forth the requisites for successive habeas corpus re1
view. 16
3 Justice Powell asserted that the judiciary should "weigh
the interests of the individual prisoner against the sometimes
contrary interests of the State in administering a fair and rational
system of criminal laws."" After enunciating this standard, Justice Powell opined that a defendant must "supplement[] his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence"' 65 before his interest in accessing a forum for a successive habeas proceeding will outweigh the countervailing state
interests. 166 Justice Powell asserted that adoption of this standard would effectuate what he viewed as the Congressional intent
behind the habeas statutes-to grant successive habeas petitions
in rare instances. 67 In balancing the conflicting interests in
Kuhlmann, Justice Powell asserted that the evidence of Wilson's
guilt was "nearly overwhelming." 168 In view of the fact that Wilson's constitutional claim failed to raise any question as to his
guilt or innocence, Justice Powell ruled that the successive
163

Justice Powell cited 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1982) which provides in pertinent

part:
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a
court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United
States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application
alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated
on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the
court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or
otherwise abused the writ.
Kuhlmann, 106 S.Ct. at 2624 n.10 (Powell,J., plurality opinion) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) (1982)).
164 Id. at 2625 (Powell,J., plurality opinion). Justice Brennan, in dissent, pointed
out that the balancing test previously utilized by the Court was strictly limited to
cases of procedural default in state court. See id. at 2632-33 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
165 Id. at 2627 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). See generally Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970) (arguing for adoption of "colorable showing of innocence" before state criminal conviction could be collaterally attacked).
166 Kuhlmann, 106 S.Ct. at 2627 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
167 Id. at 2625-26 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
168 Id. at 2628 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Wilson v. Henderson, 742
F.2d 741, 742 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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69
habeas petition should be dismissed.'
The plurality's analysis next shifted to the sixth amendment
argument for Wilson's entitlement to relief under the standard
set forth in Henry. 1 70 Justice Powell began his inquiry by reviewing Massiah and its progeny. 17 1 The Justice observed that the
constitutional protections promulgated by the Massiah line of
cases were primarily concerned with "secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation."'' 72 The plurality posited that, standing alone, an
informant's report of a criminal defendant's incriminating state17
ments is not violative of the sixth amendment right to counsel. 1
Additionally, the plurality ruled that a victimized defendant must
demonstrate that the police and the informant performed some
action designed to deliberately elicit incriminating remarks. 7 4
Justice Powell asserted that something beyond an informant's
mere listening is necessary before a sixth amendment violation
occurs. 17' Embracing this standard, the Court asserted that Lee
had not "deliberately elicited" information from Wilson. 176 Accordingly, the plurality held that the circuit court erred in deter17 7
mining that Wilson's right to counsel was violated.
169 Id. This determination was based on the ground that a prior judgment denying relief must be final when an appeal is based on an identical claim. Id.
170 Id. The plurality determined that the facts of Wilson presented the question of
a passive listener testifying with regard to incriminating statements he had overheard. Id.
171 See id. See also supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
172 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2630 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
173 Id. AsJustice Powell asserted in Henry, "the Sixth Amendment is not violated
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains incriminating statements
from the accused after the right to counsel has attached." Id. (quoting Henry, 447
U.S. at 276 (Powell, J., concurring)).
174 Id. An attempt must be made by the informant to elicit the inculpatory statements. Id. This does not necessarily mean that an informant must directly question
the defendant. See id. All that is needed is a finding that the informant's actions are
the equivalent of direct police interrogation. Id.
175 Id. The Kuhlmann plurality stated that the "listening post" exception was a
question they would reserve for future review. Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. The plurality determined that the circuit court erred in implicitly concluding that Wilson did not present the issue of a passive informant's testimony-the
specific question reserved in Henry. Justice Powell observed that a prior arrangement for a police informant to be in close proximity to a criminal defendant does
not necessarily constitute a sixth amendment violation of the right to counsel. Id.
The plurality observed that the trial court found that Lee had not "interrogated"
Wilson. Id. The plurality noted Judge Van Graafeiland's dissent in the lower court
wherein he asserted that the majority could not " 'dispense with the presumption
that the State court's factual findings are correct without an adequate explanation
as to why the findings are not fairly supported by the record.' " Id. at 2630 n.23
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Concurring in an opinion notable for its extreme brevity as
well as for its vehemence, Chief Justice Burger opined that he
viewed Kuhlmann as presenting a vastly different situation from
that in Henry. 17 8 The ChiefJustice refused to extend the applicability of the sixth amendment right to counsel further than Henry
had previously established. 79 Additionally, the Chief Justice
took this opportunity to underscore his extreme displeasure with
the abusive use of successive habeas corpus petitions. ' 8° The
Chief Justice declared that "the abuse of the Great Writ needs to
be curbed so as to limit, if not put a stop to the 'sporting contest'
theory of criminal justice so widely practiced today.''
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan first addressed the
plurality's treatment of the habeas corpus issue. 8 2 Although a
majority of the Court implicitly rejected the view of habeas
corpus posited by Justice Powell, the importance of the issues
raised compelled Justice Brennan to illustrate why he believed
this view was incorrect.1 8 3 Justice Brennan decisively rejected the
plurality's interpretation and extrapolation of Sanders.'84 The
Justice agreed with the plurality's finding that Sanders left open
"the question of what considerations should inform a court's decision that successive review of an issue previously decided will
(quoting Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 749 (2d Cir. 1984) (Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting)). The Court declared, therefore, that the circuit court's failure to accord to the state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correctness, which
is expressly required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), resulted in the erroneous conclusion.
Id. at 2630. The Kuhlmann plurality determined that the circuit court's interpretation of the facts was "completely at odds" with the factual findings espoused by the
trial court. Accordingly, the plurality reversed the judgment of the circuit court
and concluded that the facts did not present a violation of Wilson's sixth amendment right to counsel. Id.
178 Id. at 2631 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, the author of
Henry, contended that Kuhlmann presented the question of a passive informer which
he had refused to address in Henry. Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.

See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra note 157.
See Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2631 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
emphasized the importance of habeas review as a basic safeguard against unconstitutional deprivations of liberty. See id. at 2632 (Brennan,J., dissenting). In support
of his contentions, Justice Brennan traced the legislative history of the habeas
corpus legislation. Id. at 2632-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Justice also
pointed to Congress' adoption of the standards established in Sanders to govern
successive habeas corpus review. Id. at 2635 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182
183
184
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serve the 'ends ofjustice.' "185 The dissent, however, contended
that the question was not reserved for consideration at a later
date, but left open "to the sound discretion of federal trial judges
because the definition of the 'ends of justice' 'cannot be too
finely particularized.' "186
The dissent characterized the plurality's effort to define
when the "ends ofjustice" are served as an unwarranted attempt
to graft a requirement of actual innocence onto 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b). 87 Additionally, the dissent rejected as revisionist the
plurality's espousal of a balancing test to determine entitlement
to review of successive habeas petitions.1 88 Justice Brennan distinguished the precedents cited by the plurality to support its assertion that the state's interests may be balanced against the
defendant's interests in granting successive habeas petitions. 189
The Justice posited that this case law merely established a narrow
exception for habeas review of claims procedurally defaulted in
state court. 190 In support of his proposition, Justice Brennan espoused the rule " 'that the federal habeas petitioner who claims
he is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court in
violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have the
federal habeas court make its own independent determination of
his federal claim. . . .' "19
Justice Brennan found further support in the primary habeas
corpus statutes 9 2 which do not establish guilt or innocence as a
consideration for the granting of review of a successive habeas
185 Id. at 2632 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2628 n.18 (Powell,J.,
plurality opinion)).
186 Id. (quoting Sanders, 376 U.S. at 17).
187 Id. at 2634-35 (Brennan,J., dissenting). The plurality contended that a colorable showing of factual innocence should be a necessary prerequisite for review of
successive habeas corpus petitions. Id.; see also supra note 163 (text of § 2244(b)).
188 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2632 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 2632-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 2633 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The narrow categories in which the
Supreme Court has denied habeas review were interpreted in very different ways by
Justice Powell and Justice Brennan. Justice Powell viewed these denials of habeas
review as examples of the Court's willingness to balance the interests of the State
against that of the individual criminal defendant. Id. at 2623-24 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Justice Brennan, however, contended that the cases denying habeas
review merely carve out narrow exceptions to the established body of habeas
corpus law. Id. at 2633-34 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 2633 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.

72, 87 (1977)).
192 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) governs applications for habeas writs. See supra note 163
(text of § 2244(b)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants the federal courts statutory authority
to issue writs. See supra note 1 (text of § 2241).
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petition. 193 The dissenting Justice further observed that neither
statute suggested a need to balance the interests of the state
against the defendant. 194 Accordingly, the dissent opined that
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting reconsideration of the defendant's sixth amendment claim.'

95

The dissent next attacked the plurality's treatment of the
sixth amendment right to counsel.196 Justice Brennan contended
that the plurality mischaracterized the circuit court's treatment of
the facts and issues presented. 19 7 The dissent rejected the plurality's conclusion that the circuit court had failed to accord the
state trial court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness.' 98
On the contrary, Justice Brennan opined that the circuit court
had expressly accepted the trial court's fact findings. 99 Despite
these findings, Justice Brennan noted that the circuit court "concluded that, as a matter of law, the deliberate elicitation standard
of Henry . . . and Massiah . . . encompasses other, more subtle

forms of stimulating incriminating admissions than overt
questioning. 20 0
Accordingly, Justice Brennan reasoned that while the informant failed to ask any express questions about the crimes, the
combined actions of the police and the informant could constitute "deliberate elicitation. '2 0 ' The dissent posited that when
Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2634 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Brennan also noted that Congress has had several bills before it
proposing habeas corpus revision. Id. On each occasion, Congress has consistently
refused to authorize any significant alterations in the habeas statutes. Id.
195 Id. at 2636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan opined that Wilson advanced a "potentially meritorious Sixth Amendment claim. [Wilson] also advanced
a complete justification for returning to federal court a second time with [his]
claim." Id.
196 Id. The dissent rejected the plurality's assertion that Kuhlmann presented the
"listening post" question reserved in Henry. Id.
197 Id. The trial court merely determined that Lee did not ask Wilson any direct
questions about the crime. Id. It interpreted this fact through a consideration of
New York State precedents. Id. The state trial court asserted that under its precedents a showing of affirmative interrogation was necessary before a violation of the
sixth amendment could be found. Id.
198 Id. at 2637 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199 See id. The court of appeals found the existence of deliberate elicitation
"[e]ven accepting that Lee did not ask Wilson any direct questions... " Wilson, 742
F.2d at 745.
200 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2637 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 See id. at 2639 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan posited that the government's conduct in placing Wilson in a cell overlooking the scene of the crime
could be viewed as a factor in finding deliberate elicitation by the police and their
agents. Id. Although Lee did not directly question Wilson, he made comments
designed to stimulate conversation about the crimes charged. Id.
193
194
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viewed in this manner, Wilson's case "did not present the situation reserved in Henry, where an accused makes an incriminatory
remark within the hearing of a jailhouse informant, who 'makes
no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged.' "22 Instead, the dissent asserted
that Wilson's case
20 3
was virtually indistinguishable from Henry.
In support of these contentions, the dissent analogized the
Court's decision in Henry with the facts in Kuhlmann.2 °4 The dissent determined that the factors in Henry held to be dispositive of
a finding of deliberate elicitation were present in Wilson's situation.205 The dissent asserted that the totality of the government's
behavior should be considered whenever the "deliberately elicited" standard is utilized.20 6 The dissent posited that "[t]he State
intentionally created a situation in which it was foreseeable that
the respondent would make incriminating statements without the
assistance of counsel. 2 °7 Justice Brennan, therefore, determined that Wilson's sixth amendment right to counsel was violated by the state's actions.20 8 Accordingly, the dissent would
have affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.20 9
Justice Stevens, in a brief dissent, opined that when reviewing successive habeas corpus petitions, a colorable claim of innocence can be considered, but that it is not a vital element for
disposition of the petition. 210 TheJustice, however, was less em-

phatic in asserting that successive habeas review was required in
Wilson's case. 2 1 1 He stated that the case was a close one which

could have been decided either way without raising the abuse of
Id. at 2637 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9).
Id. Justice Brennan stressed that deliberate elicitation was found in Henry
even though the informant did not ask direct questions of the defendant. Id. at
2638 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204 Id.; see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
205 Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2639 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206 Id.
207 Id. The dissent determined that several elements combined to create an atmosphere likely to induce the elicitation of incriminating remarks. First, the government assigned Wilson to a cell overlooking the crime scene. Id. at 2639
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, Lee was known to Wilson on an informal basis.
Id. Third, Lee's status as a government informant was not known by Wilson. Id. at
2638 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, Lee was in a position to gain Wilson's trust.
Even though Lee avoided asking direct questions, his position enabled him to elicit
incriminating information. Id.
208 Id. at 2639 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209 Id.
210 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211 Id.
202
203
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discretion charge.2" 2 Ultimately, he agreed with Justice Brennan's examination of Henry and the dissent's affirmation of the
judgment of the court of appeals.213
Despite the Court's thorough examination of successive
habeas petitions, the Kuhlmann decision leaves certain issues unresolved. Justice Powell's opinion splintered the Court over what
constitutes proper treatment of successive habeas corpus petitions. 24 "' Justice Blackmun and Justice White joined Justices
O'Conner, Burger, Rehnquist, and Powell in the plurality's assessment of the sixth amendment issue presented in Kuhlmann.
Significantly, however, Justices Blackmun and White declined to
join either Justice Powell's treatment of successive habeas corpus
petitions or any of the dissents' habeas arguments. A majority of
the Court, therefore, implicitly disagreed with Justice Powell's
opinion regarding habeas corpus.21 5 The silence of Justice
Blackmun and Justice White on this issue produces an atmosphere of uncertainty, leaving the status of the habeas corpus arguments raised by Justice Powell unclear. If the issue of
successive habeas petitions were to arise again in different circumstances, it is questionable how their pivotal votes would be
cast. It appears likely, however, that the refusal by Justices Blackmun and White to support the plurality's habeas determinations
signals their willingness to join the position espoused by the
Kuhlmann dissenters.
The uncertainty engendered by the silence of the two concurring Justices colors any analysis of Kuhlmann's affect on the
availability of habeas corpus relief. A majority of the Court may
in the future reject the need for a "colorable showing of factual
innocence ' 216 as a prerequisite for federal review of successive
habeas petitions. 2 17 In addition, a majority of the Court may reaffirm the decision to leave review of successive habeas petitions
to the discretion of the federal trial judges for resolution on a
case-by-case basis. 2 8 This places the discretionary power to decide whether relief should be granted at the place where it can
212 Id. Justice Stevens would leave the decision to grant or deny review of successive habeas corpus petitions to the discretion of the federal trial judges to resolve
on a case-by-case basis. Id.
213 Id.
214 See id. at 2618-19.
215 See id.
216 Id. at 2627 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
217 See Sanders, 376 U.S. at 1.
218 See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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best be utilized. Similarly, a majority of the Court may not find it
necessary to particularize standards beyond the "ends ofjustice"
for the federal courts to follow in rendering decisions on successive applications.
Justice Powell's attempt to institute a balancing test 2 '9 for
accessing a federal forum for successive habeas petitions has a
better chance for success on future review. On prior occasions,
the Court has permitted a balancing of the interests of the state
against those of the defendant.2 2 ° While adoption of this balancing test was expressly limited to cases of procedurally defective
claims, it signaled the Court's willingness to utilize this method
to limit habeas review. If the unpublished reservations of either
Justice Blackmun or Justice White are asserted in the future, the
scope of habeas corpus review may be substantially limited.
The manner in which the plurality addressed the sixth
amendment right to counsel issue also raises several questions.221 The Court interpreted Massiah and its progeny as
prohibiting "secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that
are the equivalent of direct police interrogation. "222 Curiously,
and without expressly stating so, this determination in Kuhlmann
overruled a portion of Henry. 2 23 The Henry Court had specifically
rejected the argument that deliberate elicitation exists only
where the functional equivalent of direct interrogation is present. 22 4 Kuhlmann therefore transformed the Henry "likely to induce" test into a much stricter standard. Deliberate elicitation
must currently be proven by evidence of the use of methods
equivalent to interrogation by the police.
This curtailment of sixth amendment rights reflects the Burger Court's general tendency to constrict the privileges extended
by the Warren Court.2 2 5 While the Massiah line of cases have not
been expressly overruled, their utility has been significantly cir219 See Kuhlmann, 106 S. Ct. at 2624 (Powell, J., plurality opinion); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
220 See generally Marcus, FederalHabeasCorpus After State Court Default: A Definition of
Cause and Preudice, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 663 (1985) (analyzing Wainwright "cause
and prejudice" standard for granting successive habeas corpus review).
221 See Kuhlmann, 106 S.Ct. at 2628 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
222 Id. at 2630 (Powell,J., plurality opinion). This result was contrary to the standard established by the Court in Henry. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying
text.
223 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271; see also supra notes 141-51 (discussion of Henry).
224 Id.
225 See generally McMahon, Recent Criminal Law Rulings From the Supreme Court: The
Conservative Bloc Begins to Exercise Control, 3 DEL. LAw 49 (1984) (examining trend of
Burger Court to restrict expansion of constitutional rights for criminal defendants).
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cumscribed by the decision in Kuhlmann. The content and tone
of the plurality opinion suggests that the question reserved in
Henry would be resolved in a similar fashion to Kuhlmann.226 If
Lee's actions were condoned in Kuhlmann, then certainly the
Court will not find a violation of the sixth amendment when the
government utilizes passive informants to garner inculpatory
information.
The Court's decision in Kuhlmann marks an erosion of the
sixth amendment protections established in Massiah and subsequent decisions. In Massiah, the Court concluded that once the
right to counsel attaches, the government must deal through and
not around a defendant's attorney.227 Kuhlmann eases the government's ability to circumvent the sixth amendment protections
established by the Court over the past twenty-two years. Any
means may now be utilized to garner inculpatory information as
long as they are not the functional equivalent of direct police interrogation. Thus, the precise nature of government conduct
prohibited by the sixth amendment has become a clouded and
uncertain issue.
Andrea A. Lipuma
226
227

See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207.

